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To comprehend Liszt's greatness one needs a suspension of distaste, a
momentary renunciation of musical scruples.
-Charles Rosent
In the 100th year following the death of Franz Liszt, Richard Posner
has published the third edition of his own classic work, The Economic
Analysis of Law.' This coincidence is in some sense fitting, for, in many
respects, what Liszt was to the piano and musical composition, Posner
is to legal scholarship and public policy. Just as Liszt was the dominant
figure in the creation of the modem pianist, Posner has presided over
the rise of law and economics in the domain of legal scholarship. Just
as everyone concedes that Liszt demonstrated immense talent in per-
forming his own and others' music, no one disputes Posner's abilities as
an outstanding scholar and expositor of his own and others' economic
analyses of legal issues.
But both Liszt and Posner have heard some dissent amidst the ap-
plause. Some music critics claim that, despite his technical brilliance,
Liszt's obsession with virtuosity led him astray at times. Liszt's flashi-
ness exceeded the bounds of the aesthetically pleasing, becoming at
times unpleasant or even unlistenable. Even his most ardent support-
ers agree that a number of Liszt's compositions are marred by uneven-
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ness, superficiality, or barren virtuosic ornamentation and would best
be forgotten. At times Posner is also guilty of such lapses or excesses.
His third edition provides ample new material to test this view: Posner
has added more than twenty-five sections and 150 pages of new mate-
rial to the work.
Cynics might speculate that the excesses of the third edition reflect
an effort to curry presidential favor in hopes of a Supreme Court nomi-
nation.2 While Posner's beliefs often converge remarkably with Presi-
dent Reagan's, 3 the third edition shows unmistakably that Posner is a
man of deep intellectual conviction. His newly added analysis of rape
illustrates this:
Suppose a rapist derives extra pleasure from the coercive character of
his act. Then there would be no market substitute for rape and it could
be argued therefore that rape is not a pure coercive transfer and should
not be punished criminally. But the argument would be weak:
(a) . . . The prevention of rape is essential to protect the marriage
market . . . and more generally to secure property rights in women's
persons. Allowing rape would be the equivalent of communalizing
property rights in women....
(b) Allowing rape would lead to heavy expenditures on protecting
women, as well as expenditures on overcoming those protections. The
expenditures would be largely offsetting, and to that extent socially
wasted.
(c) Given the economist's definition of value.., the fact that the rap-
ist cannot find a consensual substitute does not mean that he values the
2. Posner is often mentioned as a candidate for Supreme Court appointment. See, e.g.,
Macey, ConservativeJudgment Time, Wall St.J., Aug. 23, 1985, at 14, col. 4 (to "get a promotion
the boss must be happy with your work").
3. This convergence is dramatically reflected in Posner's newly added discussion of tax
expenditures. Such tax expenditures are an issue of central importance in analyzing the gov-
ernment budget. P. 469; see Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy:
A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARv. L. REV. 705, 734-35, 738 (1970).
When President Reagan's budget director, David Stockman, proposed eliminating a vast array
of these tax expenditures, including the oil depletion allowance:
the President became animated. [The] proposal unleashed a pent-up catechism on
the virtues of the oil depletion allowance, followed by a lecture on how the whole
idea of "tax expenditures" was a liberal myth.
"The idea implies that the government owns all your income and has the right to
decide what you can keep," said the President. "Well, we're not going to have any of
that kind of thinking round here."
D. STocKmAN, THE TRIUMPH OF POLMCS 131 (1986). Posner's recent discussion of tax ex-
penditures mirrors the President's views:
Although many income tax deductions are questionable, ... to call them subsi-
dies is implicitly to treat the government as the owner of all the personal income in
the country. It is to say that by allowing deductions-or for that matter by setting the
tax rate anywhere below 100 percent-the government is making a gift to the person
whom it allows to keep some of the income that he earned through his own work or
investment.
P. 469. Yet, as Stockman demonstrates, the refusal or inability to comprehend the value of
tax expenditure analysis contributed significantly to the massive growth in governmental
budget deficits under the Reagan Administration.
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rape more than the victim disvalues it .... 4
These are the words of a man driven by an intellectual vision, not by
concerns with promotion. In a similar fashion Posner seems willing to
dare opprobrium by questioning the prohibition against selling babies:
Should the sale of babies be made legal? The idea strikes most people
as bizarre and offensive .... However, economists like to think about
the unthinkable, so let us examine in a scientific spirit the objections to
permitting the sale of babies for adoption.
5
While economics is a powerful and valuable tool in the analysis of
legal and public policy issues, those who use it need an appreciation of
its limitations. As the Nobel prize winner James Tobin noted, "Any
good second year graduate student in economics could write a short
examination paper proving that voluntary transactions in votes would
increase the welfare of the sellers as well as the buyers." 6 In the vote-
selling case, however, economic arguments must bow to democratic
concerns. Posner, though, does not always manifest a proper apprecia-
tion of such limits on economic analysis. Unfortunately, this shortcom-
ing may deter many from reading his otherwise valuable book or
improperly discredit the entire realm of law and economics.
But while selected passages may infuriate some, the work as a whole
continues to be the best exposition of the Chicago School's influential
approach to law and economics. 7 Posner's willingness and ability to
canvass "in a scientific spirit" the entire domain of law is indeed praise-
worthy. His attempts to give an economic account of legal doctrine
ranging from the Rule Against Perpetuities to the regulation of por-
nography are both provocative and insightful.8 Posner unites disparate
4. P. 202. Posner's economic analysis of rape is derived from an earlier work. Posner, An
Economic Theory of Criminal Law, 85 CoLUM. L. REv. 1193 (1985). There, Posner suggests that
rape is an economic substitute for both marriage and sex, because in a "high fraction of
rapes-approaching 50% in some surveys-.., the rapist and the victim have a prior acquain-
tance." Id. at 1199 n.14. Rape should be deterred because "instead of furtively stalking wo-
men, [rapists] can obtain satisfaction from productive activities, that is, activities in which
other people are compensated and thus derive benefits." Id. at 1199. For Posner, then, mar-
riage and prostitution are similar productive activities in that women are compensated for sex.
See also West, Submission, Choice, and Ethics: A Reoinder to Judge Posner, 99 HARv. L. REv. 1449,
1449 (1986) (Posner views "the legal availability of prostitution, (along with other sex markets
such as dating and marriage), as a reason for the wrongness of rape.").
Posner concludes: "All this may seem to be a hopelessly labored elucidation of the obvi-
ous, that rape is a bad thing, but I think it useful to point out that economic analysis need not
break down in the face of such apparently noneconomic phenomena as rape." Posner, supra,
at 1199.
5. P. 141.
6. Tobin, On Limiting the Domain oflnequality, 13 J. L. & EcoN. 263, 269 (1970).
7. Earlier editions have already been cited three times by the Supreme Court. See United
States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 36 (1984)(criticizing effectiveness of cost/benefit
analysis); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 183 n.15 (1984) (criticizing unlicensed use of
property); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 650 (1981) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing state severance taxes).
Many lower courts have also referred to the book. A recent LEXIS search uncovered 41
lower federal and 42 state citations to the work.
8. Pp. 486, 632-33.
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legal disciplines with his over-arching hypothesis that: "[J]udge-made
rules tend to be efficiency-promoting while those made by legislatures
tend to be efficiency-reducing." 9 All in all, Posner sets forth an intelli-
gent, well-written, and thought-provoking case that the "economic the-
ory of law is the most promising positive theory of law extant."' 0
Nonetheless, the book reflects the nature of Posner's genius-more
like the erratic Liszt than the consistent Mozart. While Posner provides
a provocative brief for the Chicago School's platform, his early claim
that subsequent chapters "create an economic theory of law with grow-
ing explanative power and empirical support""I is only sporadically ful-
filled. Readers of Economic Analysis of Law who are new to economics
might feel that rejecting many of Posner's policy recommendations en-
tails rejecting the entire economic approach. Our purpose, however, is
to provide an internal critique. Even if one accepts efficiency/wealth-
maximization as the proper objective of the legal system, Posner's con-
clusions at times will not withstand analysis. 12 The first section of this
review examines Posner's analysis of income distribution and its
uniquely conservative intellectual foundation. The second and third
sections then examine a variety of empirical and theoretical qualifica-
tions to Posner's work.
I. THE SUBTLE SUPERIORITY OF INCOME INEOUALITY
While most legal scholars devote relatively little attention to the is-
sues of income inequality and poverty, Posner commendably offers an
extended discussion of these topics in his book.' 3 It is highly relevant
and appropriate to address these matters. If the pattern of distribution
of economic well-being in a society is relatively fixed, then much of
what preoccupies lawyers and judges is sterile activity serving only to
shuffle the positions of those in the fixed economic hierarchy, without
fundamentally altering it or enhancing welfare.14 At the turn of the
9. P. 495 (footnote omitted).
10. P. 24.
11. P. 21.
12. The third edition does correct some problems of the second edition. For example,
in discussing the effects of labor market discrimination, Posner wrote in his second edition
that the "reduction of commercial intercourse between blacks and whites brought about by
discrimination reduces the money income of whites some but that of blacks greatly." R. Pos-
NER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 526 (2d ed. 1977). This statement is true only in special
cases. Discrimination against black laborers may actually increase the money incomes of white
employers by driving down the black wage. See Donohue, Is Title VII Efficient?, 134 U. PA. L.
REV. - (1986) (forthcoming). Posner deletes this sentence from his third edition. See P.
616.
13. Pp. 431-51.
14. Indeed, the Coase Theorem has already foreclosed an entire realm of cases in which
judicial rules are incapable of enhancing economic efficiency. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost,
3J. L. & ECON. 1, 19 (1960). When efficient and costless bribes are possible, judges cannot
affect real economic activity. After Coase, the role of judges in the absence of transaction
costs is limited to redistributing property rights. But if the overall distribution of wealth tends
to be fixed, judges in the aggregate cannot systematically affect the distribution of property.
794 [Vol. 39:791
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century, the renowned economist Vilfredo Pareto attempted to elevate
the fixed income distribution principle into a fundamental natural law,
arguing that income inevitably tends to be identically distributed, re-
gardless of social and political institutions or tax structures. 15
The greater degree of income inequality in underdeveloped coun-
tries compared to modern industrialized nations demonstrates that
Pareto's law is incorrect. 16 Posner contends, however, that: "The dis-
tribution of income changes slowly and appears to be quite similar for
different countries in the same state of economic development, such as
Sweden and the United States, even though the former is more socialis-
tic." 17 The unstated implication is that policymakers should ignore dis-
tributional questions and focus on expanding the total economic pie.
18
But is Posner correct? Certainly, the distribution of income in the
United States has varied only slightly in the last forty years. But is such
slight variance universally true? l9 Can the counter-intuitive second
part of Posner's assertion be correct that Sweden, a country that has
largely eliminated poverty through an advanced welfare system, shows
the same degree of economic inequality as the United States? In sup-
port of this proposition, Posner cites a 1967 article by Robert Solow
indicating that from 1935 to 1954 income distribution was roughly sim-
ilar in both Sweden and the United States. 20 Posner, however, presents
no data for Sweden after 1954, when Swedish income distribution be-
came far more equal than that of the United States. 21 In 1972, for ex-
ample, the poorest 20% in the United States controlled only 4.9% of
post-tax income, compared to 7.3% in Sweden-almost 50% more in-
come in the hands of the Swedish poor.22 This disparity is even more
dramatic after accounting for government transfers. 23 In fact, the Gini
measure of income inequality is 36% higher in the U.S. than in Swe-
den.24 Thus, more recent evidence undermines Posner's assertion that
Sweden and the United States have roughly the same income distribu-
tion. Moreover, the divergence in the relative distributions of income
of Sweden and the United States from 1955 to 1972 suggests that dedi-
15. P. SAMUELSON & W. NoRnHAus, ECONOMICS 566 n.3 (12th ed. 1985).
16. See Sawyer, Income Distribution in OECD Countries, OECD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK, OCCA-
SIONAL STUDIES (July 1976).
17. P. 431.
18. P. 436.
19. Kuznets has argued that a country's pattern of income inequality over time is u-
shaped: Income inequality at first increases and then decreases with development. Kuznets,
Economic Growth and Income Inequality, 45 Am. ECON. REV. 1 (1955).
20. P. 431 n.2 (citing Solow, Income Inequality Since the War, in INEQUALrrY AND POVERTY
50, 60 (E. Budd ed. 1967)).
21. Solow, supra note 20, at 59 chart 4, 60 chart 5.
22. Sawyer, supra note 16, at 19 table 10.
23. In Sweden the post-transfer figure rose to 9A in 1972. Id at 22, app. 3 at 24. Post-
transfer U.S. data is not available for this year, but given that Sweden's transfer system is
much larger than ours, accounting for transfers would likely increase the disparity.
24. Id at 19 table 11 (.369 in the U.S. and .271 in Sweden). The Gini measure ranges
from 0, indicating perfect equality, to 1, representing the highest degree of inequality.
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cated efforts to pursue equality, such as those introduced in post-war
Sweden, can change the distribution of income rapidly.25
Once one recognizes that the distribution of income can be influ-
enced by policy, one must decide whether and to what extent it should
be. Posner points out possible flaws in the arguments favoring redistri-
bution. While noting that equalizing income will increase utility if dif-
ferent income groups have similar utility curves, he questions whether
this premise is correct. He repeats the claim of his second edition that
"[i]t seems at least as plausible... to assume that income and the mar-
ginal utility thereof are positively correlated-that the people who work
hard to make money and succeed in making it are on average those who
value money the most."'2 6 In his third edition, Posner buttresses this
previously bald assertion by noting that the wealthy have "given up
other things such as leisure" to get their money.27 The argument is
interesting and worth considering, but one should also consider its po-
tential shortcomings. Certainly, if the only thing that determined in-
come was how much leisure one had given up to obtain it, Posner's case
would be greatly strengthened. Some wealth is obtained through in-
heritance, though, and when natural abilities differ widely, the connec-
tion between sacrifice and wealth becomes attenuated.28 It seems to be
25. Sweden's dramatic success in equalizing income distribution has not been at the ex-
pense of total GNP. In fact, per capita income in Sweden and the United States are roughly
equivalent. See OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS: SWEDEN, table, Basic Statistics: International Comapar-
isons (1981); The World in Figures 13 (compiled by The Economist) (4th ed. 1984).
26. P. 436. Posner does not mean to imply that the marginal utility of income rises as an
individual's income rises. His statement instead suggests that, if one were to measure current
income and the current marginal utility in a cross-section study, these two variables would be
positively correlated.
27. Id.
28. If, due to differences in natural ability, one individual earns $100 for working the
41st hour in a week but another equally trained individual earns only $50, can one really say
that the more talented individual values the money more? If they both choose to work 41
hours, the less talented has shown a willingness to give up one extra hour of leisure to obtain
$50 while the more talented may not have been willing to make such a sacrifice for $50. In




* of ho-., worked # of hours worked
This situation is depicted in Figures 1(A) and (B). Figure (A) illustrates Posner's view
that, where wages are the same for two individuals, the one who works more and earns more
[Vol. 39:791
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a nonsequitur that the people who work hard to make money "and suc-
ceed in making it" are on average those who value money the most.
The equation of success with desire seems unwarranted.
The third edition also presents a new argument against wealth re-
distribution. Even if all income groups had similar utility functions, in
which case redistributing income more equally would increase aggre-
gate happiness or utility, Posner reminds us that he is not concerned
with utility, but rather with wealth maximization. He is indifferent to
whether a dollar is held by a rich person or a poor one-a dollar is a
dollar. Consequently, the act of transferring the dollar to the poor per-
son does not increase the wealth of society; since redistribution cannot
be achieved costlessly, efforts toward redistribution necessarily reduce
societal wealth. Thus the goal of wealth maximization argues against
redistribution. While the argument follows logically from its premises,
many will find this argument a greater indictment of the principle of
wealth maximization than of the concept of redistribution. Indeed, by
rejecting the goal of utility maximization, Posner is completely at odds
with the fundamental tenet of welfare economics. Virtually the entire
economics profession would oppose Posner on this crucial element of
his analysis.
In his first chapter, Posner appears to concede the normative limita-
tions of the wealth maximization objective:
Suppose that pituitary extract is ... very expensive. A poor family has
a child who will be a dwarf if he does not get some of the extract, but
the family cannot afford the price.... A rich family has a child who will
grow to normal height, but the extract will add a few inches more, and
his parents decide to buy it for him. In the sense of value used in this
book, the pituitary extract is more valuable to the rich than to the poor
family, because value is measured by willingness to pay .... 2 9
Posner then casually dismisses this issue, stating that such limitations
are "perhaps not serious ones, as such examples are very rare."30 He
offers no authority for this absolutely pivotal empirical assertion. In a
country where thousands of children are homeless and hungry,31 while
money-worker 1-presumably places a higher value on money, since S' is below S2. In case
(B), however, where differences in money income are caused only by differences in wage rates,
the situation is reversed. In this case, two individuals who work equally hard may not be
equally successful in earning money, because of differences in innate abilities. The low in-
come individual-worker 2-has the lower supply curve at all points. This implies that worker
2 values money more than worker 1, since he is willing to give up more leisure time to obtain
it.
29. Pp. 11-12.
30. P. 12 (emphasis added).
31. Pear, Homeless in U.S. Put at 250,000, Far Less than Previous Estimates, N.Y. Times, May
2, 1984, at AI, col 2; Rule, Shelters Offer Street Youths Haven in City, N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1984,
at A37, col. 1 (20,000 homeless children in New York City alone in 1983). National estimates
for the number of homeless persons range from 250,000 to three million. We restrict our
attention to homeless children to counter any argument that homelessness is voluntary or
results from a preference for leisure.
February 1987] 797
HeinOnline -- 39 Stan. L. Rev. 797 1986-1987
STANFORD L4 W REVIEW [Vol. 39:791
others spend hundreds of dollars for a single meal,3 2 Posner's insis-
tence upon measuring social welfare by ability to pay is, to say the least,
problematic.
Emboldened by these new arguments, Posner makes possibly the
most imperial pronouncement of the third edition: "Involuntary redis-
tribution is a coerced transfer not justified by high market-transaction
costs; it is, in efficiency terms, a form of theft.' '33 This statement seems
to imply that efforts to provide governmental assistance to the elderly
and poor should be deemed criminal. But while involuntary redistribu-
tion may distress some, it remains inevitable in the United States as
long as the government provides for public goods, such as the national
defense. Unless the government can tax in such a fashion that all tax-
payers pay exactly what the national defense is worth to them, the pro-
vision for the national defense via taxation-indeed the provision for
any public good via taxation-will necessarily lead to redistributions of
real income.34
Posner might respond that the involuntary redistribution associated
with furnishing the national defense is justified by "high market-trans-
32. Carmody, High Rent District: Room With aJuly 4 View, N.Y. TimesJune 5, 1986, at Al,
col. 4 (some restaurants charged $700-$800 for a Statue of Liberty Centennial Fourth ofJuly
dinner). That such vast sums went to commemorate our sheltering the "tired and poor" is
somewhat ironic.
33. P. 436.
34. The only exception to this statement is the unlikely situation in which every individ-
ual equally values the public good. Redistribution will occur even if the government can tax
according to a Lindahl pricing scheme in which each individual pays an amount equal to the
marginal benefit received from the public good. Lindahl,Just Taxation-A Posifthe Solution, in
CLASSICS IN THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 168 (R. Musgrave & A. Peacock 2d ed. 1962).
Two individuals with the same Lindahl price will differ in terms of the consumer surplus en-
joyed on the inframarginal units of the public good. Hence, redistribution of real income




Figure 2 illustrates this type of redistribution, where S represents the amount of a public
good G that is supplied by the government and DI and D2 represent the individual demand
curves of consumers I and 2 for G. Given these curves, both individuals will pay the same
Lindahl price-$X per unit of G-but consumer 2 enjoys a far greater consumer surplus than
consumer I. Thus, the provision of the public good enhances the well-being of consumer 2
relative to that of consumer 1, even though they both pay the same tax and receive the same
amount of G.
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HeinOnline -- 39 Stan. L. Rev. 798 1986-1987
POSNER'S SYMPHONY NO. 3
action costs." An equitable distribution of income, however, is a public
good as surely as is national defense.3 5 Unless the government is will-
ing and able to ascertain precisely what each individual would spend to
achieve this good, involuntary redistribution of the same sort that re-
sults from taxing to provide for the national defense will occur.
Realizing that his "redistribution is theft" argument is a bold one,
Posner considers "[a]n exception to this harsh proposition."3 6 When
poverty hurts the rich-e.g., by increasing crime-there is an economic
justification for "governmental efforts to reduce the gross inequality (in
a wealthy society) that we call poverty."37 In support of this position,
Posner states that "[p]robably the major cost of poverty ... is the disu-
tility it imposes on affluent altruists." s38 Poverty is bad because it hurts
the rich. Viewing the world from Posner's perspective, the statement is
accurate-the rich are willing and able to pay more for the elimination of
poverty. Since the rich pay more to eliminate poverty, poverty costs
them more than it does those who cannot afford food or shelter. Econ-
omists generally view this as further evidence that wealth maximization
is devoid of normative significance. This realization permits us to re-
turn to the fundamentally sounder notion that poverty is bad because it
hurts the poor.
In one sense, Posner's lack of concern for income equality is not
surprising. He is concerned instead with how incentives are arrayed for
individuals, not with distributional outcomes. Thus, in the criminal
sphere, Posner is indifferent between case A, where ten crimes are com-
mitted and each criminal is punished by one year in jail, and case B,
where the same ten crimes are committed but only one criminal is ap-
prehended and punished by ten years in jail.39 The expected punish-
ment,40 and thus the level of deterrence, is the same in these two
cases. 41 Such ex ante justice satisfies Posner since his primary concern is
with the level of crime and the amount of societal resources required to
deter crime to this level.42 Indeed, this latter factor prompts Posner to
35. Posner acknowledges this public-good quality by recognizing the "free-rider prob-
lem" associated with private charity. Pp. 439-40. Since many benefit from expenditures that
either increase defense or reduce poverty, autonomous individuals purchase an inefficiently
small amount of such public goods.
36. P. 436 n.3.
37. P. 439.
38. Id.
39. See P. 212. Posner's analysis draws upon the work of Gary S. Becker. See Becker,
Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76J. POL. EcoN. 169 (1968). A more distant ante-
cedent isJ. BENTHAM, THE RATIONALE OF PUNISHMENT 19-41 (1830).
40. The expected punishment is the probability of apprehension multiplied by the dura-
tion of the prison sentence if caught.
41. If criminals were risk neutral, both schemes, A and B, would deter equally. But, if
criminals were risk averse, the prospect of ten years in prison would loom larger in the eco-
nomic actor's calculus, leading to less criminal activity in case B. For risk lovers, case A would
lead to a lower amount of crime.
42. Posner enthusiastically endorses ex post inequality: "To object to this result, how-
ever, is like saying that all lotteries are unfair because, ex post, they create wealth differences
February 1987] 799
HeinOnline -- 39 Stan. L. Rev. 799 1986-1987
STANFORD LAW REVIEW
prefer case B because fewer societal resources are required to capture
and try only one criminal.
43
Notice the parallel to the income distribution sphere. In case A, so-
ciety treats the wrongdoers equally. In case B, however, nine individu-
als reap the rewards of their criminal activity, while the tenth suffers an
extremely severe punishment. Anyone who sees no implications for
fairness or justice in allowing some murderers to go free while others
are hanged is unlikely to worry much about whether the poorest 20%o
of the population earn 5% or 10%o of the total income.
Posner's analysis of divorce provides another example of how his
vision leads to greater disproportionality of results. Posner notes that:
[F]orbidding divorce will induce more careful search for a marriage
partner in the first place. The more costly a mistake is, the less likely it
is to be committed; and a mistake in choosing a spouse is more costly
in a system that forbids divorce (or makes it very difficult) than in one
that permits it. So making divorce hard or impossible fosters happy
marriages!4
4
The cost/benefit analysis in this case, however, is seriously incomplete.
Means exist of making the cost of a mistaken marriage even greater-
such as cutting off the arms of divorcees-which, by Posner's reason-
ing, would foster even happier marriages. According to Posner, penal-
izing the mistake more harshly leads to the benefit of fewer bad
marriages. But costs are also involved: (1) those who entered into bad
marriages would suffer even more, and (2) individuals would expend
more time and effort searching for a mate. Theory cannot locate the
social optimum, which equates marginal costs and benefits. Once
again, Posner is willing to tolerate the severely unhappy individual-the
one forced to remain in an unhappy marriage-in order to improve the
average quality of the family.
In sum, Judge Posner's analysis of wealth distribution has three se-
among the players.... [B]oth the criminal justice system... and the lottery are fair so long as
the ex ante costs and benefits are equalized among the participants." P. 212. Arguing for the
moral legitimacy of his structuring of the criminal justice system by analogy to a game of
chance seems rather curious and unpersuasive. Loading the punishment on an isolated de-
fendant has particularly unfortunate consequences when the probability of error is not insig-
nificant. See Block & Sidak, The Cost of Antitrust Deterrence: Why Not Hang a Price Fixer Now and
Then?, 68 GEO. LJ. 1130 (1980).
43. Interestingly, Posner's view of punishment is exactly the opposite of that of Beccaria,
who clearly would have preferred caseA. To Beccaria, "nothing so weakens the machinery of
the law than the hope of going unpunished.... How can one link absolutely in the minds of
men the idea of crime and the idea of punishment, if the reality of the punishment does not
follow, in all cases, the reality of the offense?" M. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE
BIRTH OF THE PRISON 96-97 (1977).
The social science literature would appear to support Beccaria's rather than Posner's po-
sition. Since decisionmakers appear to underestimate systematically the risk of uncertain neg-
ative consequences, case A would seem to provide a greater amount of deterrence. See R.
NisBETr & L. Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIALJUDGMENT
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rious defects. First, Posner doubts that a problem exists: Instances of
inequitable distributions are, to use his own word, "rare." Second, he
feels that even if there were a problem, law and social policy could not
improve matters. After all, Posner mistakenly believes that even the
strenuous efforts to promote greater equality in Sweden have failed to
affect aggregate distribution. And finally, Posner believes that to the
extent income inequality exists it tends to be efficient. Since economic
actors respond to incentives, the bigger the carrots and sticks, the more
efficient the responses. 45 But in making this argument Posner ignores
the implications of his and Becker's theory of punishment, which holds
that fines are a more efficient means of social control than incarceration
because they merely transfer wealth while imprisonment imposes sig-
nificant social costs. If this is an important consideration, however,
then redistribution to enhance the wealth of the poor-thereby increas-
ing the ability to rely on fines as a deterrent-will increase both equity
and efficiency. Thus, by distorting facts, attributing normative signifi-
cance to the wealth maximization objective, and overlooking the conse-
quences of his own beliefs, Posner subtly promotes his vision of
"efficient" income disparity.
II. AN EMPIRICAL CRrIQUE
Posner's theoretical beliefs are so strong that he occasionally adapts
the world to fit them, by distorting one side or the other of the cost/
benefit balance to make his side prevail. This slanting of the empirics
rises sometimes to theoretical proportions, as he ignores entire well-
accepted categories of costs or benefits. What follows is a sampling of
four such empirical distortions.
A. The Truth in Lending Act
Posner's analysis of the Truth in Lending Act 46 is a clear example of
ignoring one side of the cost/benefit equation and distorting the other.
Posner opines:
The Truth in Lending Act requires uniform disclosure of ... the
interest rate. Yet it is unclear that an explicit interest rate is necessary
or even useful information to lower income people (the well-to-do and
educated borrowers should be able to protect themselves).... Every-
45. Unfortunately, extreme e ante incentives lead to extreme expost inequalities. Keynes'
cogent summary of this issue, now one-half century old, remains apt:
inhere is social and psychological justification for significant inequalities of incomes
and wealth, but not for such large disparities as exist to-day. There are valuable
human activities which require the motive of money-making and the environment of
private wealth-ownership for their full fruition.... But it is not necessary for the
stimulation of these activities and the satisfaction of these proclivities that the game
should be played for such high stakes as at present. Much lower stakes will serve the
purpose equally well, as soon as the players are accustomed to them.
J. KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY 374 (1936).
46. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1604 (1982).
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one knows what his personal discount rate is (which doesn't mean he
could attach a number to it if asked).47
Leaving aside Posner's questionable assertion that only poor people
need such protection, 48 the analysis is doubly flawed. Nowhere does
the author attempt to estimate the costs of disclosing the interest rate.
These costs are minimal: Few institutions lend without knowing the
annual interest rate, so the marginal cost of disclosure amounts to
about the cost of the ink used in printing a 2-digit number.
Instead, Posner focuses on the benefits side; the regulation is unjus-
tified if it produces no benefits. But do we really believe there are no
benefits? Posner claims that "the purchaser can compare the burden of
paying $20 a month for 40 months with that of paying $15 a month for
60 months (or $25 a month for 30 months) without being told what the
annual percentage interest rates implied by these payment schedules
are."' 4 9 This argument conflates the concepts of liquidity and opportu-
nity cost in the use of the term "burden." Admittedly, knowing the
interest rate does not affect a liquidity-constrained borrower; disclosure
is of no benefit if the borrower has no real choice. But when install-
ment plans fall within the borrower's means, disclosing the interest rate
reveals important information. 50 Indeed we invite the reader to take
Posner's own example and compare the burden of paying:
$15 a month for 60 months,
$20 a month for 40 months, and
$25 a month for 30 months.
Which is least burdensome?5 ' Wouldn't you want to know the interest
rate? At least, it seems fair to say that the benefits of such disclosure
outweigh the minimal costs.
B. The Adultery Double Standard
Posner frequently lapses into Procrustean analyses to support his
efficiency theory of the common law. For example, he offers the follow-
ing defense on efficiency grounds of the adultery double standard that
historically made it harder for wives to divorce adulterous husbands
than vice versa:
The economic explanation for this rule is that a wife's adultery is more
costly to the husband than the husband's adultery to the wife, even if
47. P. 350 (footnotes omitted).
48. Posner cites two articles as "corroborative evidence." P. 350 n.5.
49. P. 350.
50. Indeed, the widely advertised interest rate competition among car manufacturers is
prima facie evidence of the informational value in disclosing interest rates.
51. For a loan of $650 the installment plans imply annual interest rates of 14.2%,
13.4%, and 12.3%. In general, the second installment plan is globally inferior, while the third
(first) is best for personal discount rates below (above) 16.3%. Although the existence of
such "switching points" weakens the informational value of disclosure, the fact that many
manufacturers vigorously advertise their interest rate, see note 50 supra, suggests that this in-
formation is valuable to consumers.
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the purely emotional cost. . . is the same to both spouses.... If the
wife is adulterous, she may conceive a child who is not the child of her
husband, [so that] the benefits of the marriage to the husband will be
distinctly impaired, assuming he wants to have children of his blood.
But the husband's adultery need not reduce the number of children
that his wife will bear or the support he will give each of them, so the
benefits of the marriage to her, at least in terms of children, may not be
impaired.
5 2
Posner's casual empiricism overlooks a number of important factors
which tend to undercut his argument. 53 For example, Posner ignores
the externalities associated with adultery by husbands. The illegitimate
children that husbands sire are likely to impair other marriages and/or
become wards of the state. Indeed, there is absolutely no difference in
social cost between the adultery of a husband with another married wo-
man, and that of a wife with another married man. In the case where all
parties to the adultery are married, the law can inhibit adultery by sanc-
tioning either adulterous husbands or adulterous wives or both. Any of
these different schemes could be efficient if properly calibrated. How
then does economics explain why a disproportionate burden was
placed on wives?
Posner might respond that some adulteries would involve unmar-
ried partners, in which case the cost to a victimized husband would be
greater than the cost to a victimized wife, because the adulterous wife
may get pregnant. But there is clearly an offsetting social cost here-the
illegitimate children sired by adulterous husbands will be raised by sin-
gle mothers and perhaps become wards of the state.
5 4
Moreover, adultery can only impair the fertility of a fecund wife.
Many wives are not in this category. 55 Thus, Posner's justification for
the adultery double standard disregards both the wife's fertility and the
status of the third party. Only in the case of a fertile wife who is having
an affair with an unmarried man is it possible that the costs of adultery
by a wife are greater than the costs of her husband's adultery (when the
husband has an affair with an unmarried woman). If the law were moti-
vated by efficiency, as Posner claims, one would expect equal or greater
sanctions against adulterous husbands in all other circumstances. The
52. P. 133.
53. We feel that noneconomic causes (e.g., the impaired political power of women)
would seem to provide a better explanation for the rule, but in a "scientific spirit" let us
proceed.
54. Whether or not the illegitimate children become wards of the state, the adulterous
father may contribute to their upbringing because of a moral or legal obligation. To the
extent such payments are made, the adulterous father is burdening his own family by dimin-
ishing its resources. Moreover, Posner has failed to consider that husbands and wives may
differ in their propensities to commit adultery. If husbands are more inclined than their wives
to seek out unmarried sex partners, then the probability of the harm times the social cost may
be greater for adulterous husbands. If this were the case, the law would want to sanction male
adultery more harshly.
55. Besides sterility, wives' fertility is terminated by menopause or pregnancy and re-
strained by birth control.
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information costs of determining the wife's fecundity would often be
quite low, and, if one can determine that a husband has committed
adultery, it would seem to be a simple matter to determine the part-
ner's marital status. Posner's reductionist one-way theory of the com-
mon law that assumes that whatever is is efficient constitutes bad
economics and bad science. 56 In this and many other cases, Posner's
conclusory ex post efficiency rationales seem all too pat and convey the
feeling that Posner could justify any rule on efficiency grounds.
C. Public Lands
While Posner often displays considerable acumen in discovering the
hidden costs of various government actions, he is not equally ingenious
in uncovering possible benefits. For example, Posner categorically an-
nounces: "[T]here is no economic case for government ownership [of
timber land]." '5 7 "The exploitation of forests for timber, unlike the ex-
ploitation of the seas for fish, involves no externalities." 58 Thus, Pos-
ner claims that public ownership produces no benefits.
But a simple example can illustrate that there certainly are externali-
ties associated with the "exploitation of forests for timber." Assume
that a family owns a large tract of timber land around its house. The
family decides to harvest ten acres of timber. Is it likely that the family
will cut down the timber right up to the front doorstep or will it prefer
to cut down the timber far from the house along the public road? If the
family values the scenery and wildlife afforded by the trees, the choice
is obvious. Since the family will have no incentive to consider the costs
imposed on those who similarly enjoy the beauty of the trees as they
drive along the highway, the efficient level of timbering will not be
reached.59
Numerous other externalities are also associated with our national
forests, which are not simply stores of lumber. Forests contain wildlife
and flora just as seas contain fish. Thus, private ownership can lead to
the tragedy of the commons. 60 Moreover, the scenic beauty of our pub-
lic lands is valued by many Americans living at some distance. These
resources are option goods for all Americans, and the urban dweller of
New York might well be willing to pay something to preserve his option
to traipse through the unspoiled wilderness at some future time.6 1 A
private forest owner could not simply sell future rights of access, how-
56. See Gould, Cardboard Darwinism, N.Y. REv. Booss, Sept. 25, 1986, at 47. Gould
points out that similar Panglossian fallacies mar much of the sociobiological literature on gen-
der differences. Id. at 53-54.
57. P. 75.
58. P. 74.
59. Note that the Coase Theorem will not apply in this example because the transaction
costs of bribing the timber owner are too high.
60. See R. BOADWAY & D. WILDASIN, PUBLIC SECTOR ECONOMICS 127-34 (2d ed. 1984).
61. See Henry, Option Values in the Economics of Irreplaceable Assets, 89 REv. EcoN. STUD. 104
(1974).
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ever, since everyone will have an incentive to hold back and have others
preserve the forest. Furthermore, some scientists have argued that re-
ductions in the world's timber land may exacerbate the greenhouse ef-
fect that threatens the world's ecology. 62 The control of such free-rider
effects and externalities are certainly factors to be considered in evalu-
ating the need for government ownership. Posner might still argue that
these elements justify public regulation rather than ownership, or that,
since the government is so inefficient, any public role would tend to be
worse than the inefficiencies of privitization. But the point here is that
Posner stops this empirical inquiry before it starts, by declaring that
there are no externalities. By alleging that a particular government ac-
tion results in no benefits, he need not analyze the magnitude of the
costs.
D. The Exclusionary Rule
Finally, in his analysis of the fourth amendment's exclusionary rule
(added as a new chapter at the end of the book6 3 ), Posner glaringly
distorts facts to justify his desired end. While claiming to tailor the
exclusionary remedy on the basis of social costs and benefits, 64 Posner is
only willing to consider the defendant's private cost of "impaired pri-
vacy" 65 as a justification for excluding evidence derived from an illegal
search.
Posner's analysis completely ignores the social costs of future
searches undertaken against innocent people. In other words, Posner
fails to take account of how the exclusionary rule can reduce social
costs by deterring future police misconduct. Yet avoiding the social
costs of future police misconduct has been the cornerstone of the
Supreme Court's cost/benefit analysis of the exclusionary rule. The
Court emphasized this in United States v. Calandra:
The purpose of the exclusionary rule ... is to deter future unlawful
police conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth
Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures.... In sum,
the rule is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth
Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a
personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved. 6 6
62. The argument is that the greenhouse effect occurs when increasing levels of carbon
dioxide in the atmosphere trap heat that warms the earth's environment. By absorbing car-
bon dioxide, trees serve to retard this effect. See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Environmental
Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) (report
on the greenhouse effect by the National Academy of Sciences). Of course, we have no way of
evaluating the opposing positions in this scientific controversy. But unless Posner has re-
solved it, his peremptory conclusion that no externalities exist is not a well-informed
judgment.
63. Pp. 639-42.
64. Posner suggests that the court should not exclude evidence when the "cost to society
of doing without the evidence ... [exceeds] the social costs of the search." P. 641.
65. P. 640.
66. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974).
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Underestimating the costs of admitting unconstitutional evidence
predictably leads Posner to suggest a diminished exclusionary rule.
But the extent to which Posner is willing to emasculate the rule reflects
an extreme antipathy. Posner argues that evidence should be admitted
from a hypothetical search that was undertaken as "a shot in the
dark."' 67 Specifically, he justifies admitting such illegally seized evi-
dence by assuming:
Suppose that B, the cost to the defendant of the search in terms of
damage to property or seizure of lawful private communications is
$1,000; P, the probability that he could not be convicted without this
search, was 1 percent at the time of the search; and L, the social cost (in
reduced deterrence and prevention of crime) of not convicting him is
$50,000. The search will therefore be illegal under the Hand Formula.
But suppose the evidence obtained in the search is essential to convic-
tion.... [E]ven though the social cost of the search is only $1,000, the
exclusionary rule will impose a punishment cost of $50,000 on the
society.
68
Even in this hypothetical, weighing all of the social costs against the
social benefits would lead to exclusion. Given that the prior probability
that the defendant could not be convicted was 1 percent, because, ac-
cording to Posner, "the police had no good reason to think the search
would be productive," we can extrapolate that for every one search that
uncovers evidence essential to conviction, ninety-nine will not uncover
crucial evidence. The expected (future) social costs of allowing such
searches is then $100,000 ($1,000 x 100)69 while the social benefits are
only $50,000. This indicates that for the exclusionary rule to be effi-
cient, we must judge police action by ex ante probabilities.
This section has illustrated how Posner relies on questionable omis-
sions of costs or benefits to attack the Truth in Lending Act, public
lands, and the exclusionary rule, and to defend the double standard for
adultery. The next section focuses on his arguments against unions
and progressive taxation, and criticizes a number of his theoretical
propositions.
III. A THEORETICAL CRITIQUE
A. Unions
Imagine that an anti-union economist and a pro-union economist
are having a debate, but you can only see and hear the presentation of
the former. You may hear some excellent and persuasive arguments,
67. P. 641.
68. Id
69. Police and prosecutors face de facto, if not de jure, immunity for undertaking such
illegal searches, Malley v. Briggs, 54 U.S.L.W. 4243, 4245 (U.S. Mar. 5, 1986) (No. 84-1586)
(extending qualified immunity to officers who make "objectively reasonable" but unconstitu-
tional requests for warrants). Thus, the exclusionary rule remains the only viable deterrent
for unreasonable searches against innocent people.
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although at times you are somewhat confused as you hear rebuttals to
points you have not heard. Ultimately, you wonder whether the points
you are hearing or the ones that you are not hearing are more persua-
sive. Reading Posner's analysis of unions creates a similar impression.
Posner begins his one-sided dialogue by noting that a union can act
just as a monopolist (who happens to be selling labor) by restricting the
supply of labor to increase its own wealth at the expense of the commu-
nity at large. In response, the unseen, unheard opponent points out
that at times a union can serve to enhance welfare-specifically when
the union offsets the dominant power of employers (labor monopsony).
Without presenting this argument, Posner responds to it:
[E]ven if labor monopsonies were a problem (and no doubt they were
to some extent), labor monopolies are not much of a solution, at least
from an economist's standpoint. The situation is one of bilateral mo-
nopoly, and with both sides trying to limit the supply of labor, though
for different reasons, there is no assurance that the supply will reach
the competitive level .... 70
This statement is then followed by a graphical demonstration of how a
bilateral monopoly can lead to a situation that is socially worse than
either pure monopoly or pure monopsony. Posner's demonstration re-
lies on his assumption that the union acts first to cause an upward par-
allel shift in the supply curve for labor. The monopsonist, when acting
independently in the face of this exogenous higher supply curve, will
maximize profits by restricting its hiring of labor until the point at
which the marginal product of labor (given by the demand curve) inter-
sects the marginal factor cost of labor.71
Posner's analysis is correct if one assumes that the monopsonist
takes the union-generated supply curve as exogenous. But why would
it? The union and the monopsonist will realize that they can both do
better than the Posnerian outcome if they cooperate to raise the level of
labor hired. Indeed, if the union and monopsonist can agree to maxi-
mize theirjoint profits, then they will end up at the competitive (wealth-
maximizing) outcome. True, bilateral monopoly will not assuredly gen-
erate the competitive outcome, but one would think Posner would be
the last person to dispute that two parties who have come together to
bargain as unions and employers do, would have an incentive to strike a
bargain that made them both, and society, better off. Indeed, Posner's
concluding remark suggests he realizes this: "Thus, if we set aside la-
bor monopsony, which is probably not a serious problem in this coun-
try today, we can say with some confidence . . . that the effect of
70. P. 300.
71. In other words, the monopsonist realizes that by hiring more labor it is bidding up
the price it must pay, not only for newly hired workers, but for current employees as well.
Therefore, it can earn more by stopping short of hiring labor to the level given by the inter-
section of the new (shifted-up) supply curve and the demand curve.
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unionization is to reduce the supply of labor in the unionized sector." 72
Since Posner is probably correct that monopsony is rare, his failure
to point out that in cases of bilateral monopoly, unions may be welfare
enhancing is only a minor omission. But our unseen union advocate
would undoubtedly point out that Posner's statement that unions re-
duce the supply of labor in the unionized sector also overlooks that
unions commonly thrive where monopoly exists in product markets. If
a monopolist is earning supracompetitive profits by restricting the
quantity of its product, the union will have an incentive to try to garner
some of these profits for itself. As Johnson and Mieszkowski note:
If [the union] had sufficient power it might demand a profit-sharing
plan under which it would receive, possibly in the form of a contribu-
tion to a union pension fund, a certain percentage of the monopoly
profits earned in the industry. If the union chose the "tax base" cor-
rectly, the level of employment, output, and prices in a profit-maximiz-
ing monopoly would remain unchanged, and the union would gain at
the expense of the stockholders.
73
Thus if the union succeeds in "taxing" monopoly profits, no reduction
in employment or production will occur, and positive distributional
consequences may result.
74
In analyzing the effects of unions, Posner also notes that the losers
include "workers who cannot find employment because of the reduc-
tion in the demand for labor caused by union wage scales."'7 5 This is a
common argument: The union drives up wages in the steel industry,
and steel workers therefore languish in unemployment. But the situa-
tion is not quite as bleak as Posner's simple one-sector neoclassical
model suggests: If the introduction of a union causes employment to
drop in the union sector, it will increase employment in the nonunion
sector. 76 All workers who are willing to work at nonunion wages will
find work, according to the general equilibrium model. In other words,
given that all markets clear, there is no reason to believe that there




73. Johnson & Mieszkowski, The Effects of Unionization on the Distribution of Income: A Gen-
eral Equilibrium Approach, 84 Q. J. EcoN. 539, 559 (1970).
74. One study concluded that, in 1962, the wealthiest 20%o of the U.S. population held
97% of corporate stock and the wealthiest 5% held 86% of the stock. E. BUDD, INEQUALrr
AND PovERTY at xxii (1967). Thus, if we make the plausible assumption that union members
are less wealthy than stockholders, then shifts in income to union members from stockholders
will diminish income inequality.
75. P. 301.
76. For this reason, one study found the negative effect of unionization on aggregate
levels of employment to be small. See Montgomery, The Impact of Regional Difference in Unionism
on Employment, EcON. REv. 1st Quarter, 1986. The study concluded that "schooling, experi-
ence, and local labor market conditions have a much greater impact on the likelihood of being
employed than does unionism." Id. at 10.
77. Of course, a lot more could be said about this issue. Posner's statement could be
corrected to state that the losers from unionization include those who cannot find employ-
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One of the implicit premises of Posner's book is that any legal or
public policy question can be resolved by merely thinking through the
issues involved with the aid of the introductory principles of
microeconomics. Theoretical economics, however, has moved far be-
yond the simple level that Posner suggests is all one needs to know.
One needs more complex models than Posner presents and informa-
tion on a vast array of empirical questions that he ignores before one
can evaluate the effects of unionization. 78
B. Progressive Taxation
Another example of Posner treading on shaky theoretical ground is
his statement that "[t]he progressive income tax reduces the amount of
ment in the unionized sector and who are unwilling to work in the nonunionized sector. But this then
becomes a case of the so-called voluntary unemployment that Chicago-school economists in-
variably contend is not a problem.
Those who are displaced by unionization and end up working in the nonunion sector will
quite likely receive lower wages. But even this is not certain, for unionization can at times
increase nonunion wages. If the union sector is capital intensive and the elasticity of demand
for this sector's output is high, capital will flow into the nonunion sector, possibly increasing
wages in the nonunion sector. Figure 3, which shows the initial supply ("S") and demand
("D") curves for labor in the union and nonunion sectors illustrates these effects. At first both
sectors have the same wage W*. The advent of the union causes an upward shift in the supply
curve to SI. With labor costs rising in the union sector, the price of this sector's output will
rise, generating the following consequences. First, employment in the union sector will
shrink because of the substitution effect of capital replacing labor and the output effect of a
lower quantity demanded of the union sector's now higher-priced output. Second, if the out-
put effect dominates the substitution effect, relatively more capital than labor will be released
from the union sector to the nonunion sector. As a result, both the supply and demand
curves in the nonunion sector will shift out to SI and DI; ifD1 shifts further than SI, nonun-
ion wages will rise.
Figure 3






N1 N # of Workers Hired
78. Some of the important empirical questions are: which sectoc is more capital inten-
sive, is the demand for the union product highly elastic, is there a high degree of sub-
stitutability between labor and capital in the two sectors, and does significant monopoly
power exist in the product market of the union sector.
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risk taking below the optimal level." 79 He probably means that pro-
gressive taxes will discourage risk taking, and that such discouragement
is socially undesirable. Taking the second point first, it is very difficult
to assess the criteria of optimality under uncertainty. While much of
the public discussion presumes that discouraging risk taking is socially
harmful, this should be proved rather than merely asserted. Even as-
suming that we know what the optimal level of risk taking is, we can still
say with certainty that Posner's first point-that progressive taxation
reduces risk taking-is incorrect as a general proposition.
The classic paper of Domar and Musgrave 8° demonstrated that tax-
ation may actually encourage risk taking since the government shares
the risk of loss. This proposition can be demonstrated with a simple
example that assumes two assets-a safe asset, which has a zero real
return and a risky asset, which yields an uncertain but expected return
of 10 percent. If the individual begins with wealth of $100,000 and
tries to maximize the expected utility of her wealth Win one year, then
the size of Wwill depend on the fraction of initial wealth invested in the
risky asset. If the individual invests more in the risky asset, expected
wealth will rise but so will risk. The individual's choice will thus de-
pend on her aversion to risk. Assume that in the no-tax world the indi-
vidual would invest half of her income in the risky asset leaving her with
expected wealth of $105,000 ([50,000 x 1] + [50,000 x 1.1]). Now as-
sume the government imposes a 50% proportional tax. The individual
will maintain the same level of risk, net of tax, if she simply invests all of
her income in the risky asset. She will then earn an expected return of
$10,000, half of which will be taxed away. Consequently, the individual
will have the same expected wealth of $105,000 ([100,000 x 1.10] -
5,000). Total social risk has increased, however, since all of the individ-
ual's wealth is invested in a risky asset. The government is bearing the
increased risk.
The individual's risk may seem greater because in the tax world she
can lose all of her initial $100,000, while in the no-tax case she only
risked losing $50,000. Yet if the tax scheme permits full loss offset and
she loses everything, she will get a tax deduction of $100,000; worth
$50,000 to her at a 50 percent tax rate. In other words, in both the tax
and no-tax cases, she ends up with $50,000 if everything goes wrong.
If the individual cannot engage in full loss offset, private risk taking
will be commensurately curtailed. Progressive taxation is tantamount
to restricting the tax loss offsets since the individual pays a higher tax
rate if she strikes it rich than if she loses everything. Thus, risk taking
under a progressive scheme will be lower than with a proportional tax,
but we have just seen that proportional tax increases risk taking above
79. P. 473.
80. Domar & Musgrave, Proportional Income Taxation and Risk-Taking, 58 Q. J. EcoN. 388
(1944).
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the no-tax level. By selecting the level of progressivity appropriately,
one can reduce the level of risk taking from the level in the propor-
tional tax case back to the level of risk that would exist in the no-tax
case. If the level of risk in the no-tax case is what Posner considers to
be optimal, he should favor progressive taxation.
Again, if one wants to assess the impact on risk taking of a particular
progressive scheme, one must resolve a number of difficult empirical
issues. In a 1965 study, Professor Arrow concluded from time-series
evidence on the demand for money in the United States that the wealth
elasticity of demand for risky assets is positive but less than unity. This
implies that United States income taxation has increased social risk tak-
ing.8 ' While other empirical studies using cross-section evidence have
reached different conclusions, 2 this merely underscores the complex-
ity of the empirical issues, the difficulty of the theoretical analysis, and
the utter impossibility that clear thinking through simple economic
models can resolve complex policy issues.
CONCLUSION
The third edition of Economic Analysis of Law is a bold and lucidly
written brief for the Posnerian world. Readers will find few books that
challenge and inform them on such a vast array of legal issues. When
Posner is not operating under the weight of his self-imposed ideologi-
cal burdens, his work constitutes legal scholarship of the highest rank.
On the other hand, when his ideology drives his theoretical arguments
and empirical assertions, the work becomes seriously flawed. Perhaps,
it is this combination of the exceptional and the egregious that explains
why Posner, like Liszt, has generated such "extremes of adulation and
opprobrium. ' '8 3 As a result, Posner may have done more than any
other single individual both to advance and set back the field of law and
economics. While we have addressed a sizeable number of errors that
exist in Posner's work, it is important that this discussion does not ob-
scure the larger picture. Posner has been exceptionally ambitious in
attempting to analyze the entire realm of law from an economic per-
spective. Less than complete success at such a grand endeavor remains
quite a remarkable achievement.
8 4
81. K. ARROW, ASPECTS OF THE THEORY OF RISK-BEARING (1965); see also A. ATKINSON &
J. STIGLrrZ, LECTURES ON PUBLIC ECONOMICS 124 (1980).
82. D. Projector & G. Weiss, Survey of Financial Characteristics of Consumers, (Fed.
Reserve Bd. 1966) (concluding that the elasticity of demand for risky assets is greater than
unity).
83. R. TAYLOR, FRANz LISZT, THE MAN AND THE MusicIAN 258 (1986).
84. Moreover, as John Stuart Mill wrote:
[Even if the] opinion be an error, it may, and very commonly does, contain a portion
of the truth; and since the general ... opinion on any subject is rarely or never the
whole truth, it is only by the collision of adverse opinions that the remainder of the
truth has any chance of being supplied.
J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 50 (D. Spitz ed. 1975).
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Through a number of examples, we have shown that many issues
are not as simple as Posner would have us believe. Indeed, economic
reductivism systematically favors Posner's conservative platform. In a
world without externalities or public goods, in a world where income
inequality is "rare" or exogenously determined, laissez-faire policies
are efficient. When the "failings" of reality intrude, however, govern-
mental intervention may be needed to promote both equity and effi-
ciency. To the extent that Posner alerts readers to views or arguments
that they have not considered, his book will continue to be of immense
value. But it must always be recognized that the strength of Posner's
clean assumptions and clear results is in initiating legal discussions, not
in resolving them.
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